U ncertainty is a fundamental experience in human life, and medical decisions are no exception. This will not surprise readers of Medical Decision Making. The communication of risk information is a crucial activity in medicine, as risk information informs the judgments and recommendations of physicians as well as the decisions of patients. Risk communication, however, is complicated not only by the need to express uncertainty effectively, efficiently, and accurately but also by the aim to receive and perceive these communications to equitably enable consistent, coherent, and useful action.
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Two articles in this issue provide compelling demonstrations of these complications. Wegwarth, Gaissmaier, and Gigerenzer 1 asked physicians to estimate the effectiveness of cancer screening on the basis of combinations of 5-year survival rate, annual diseasespecific mortality, and incidence and found that ineffective screening programs can appear highly effective to physicians when presented as comparisons of 5-year survival rates between groups or over time. Peters, Hart, and Fraenkel 2 measured numeracy in an Internet sample and asked participants to rate the subjective risk of a hypothetical headache treatment under differently framed (as gains, as losses, or combined) descriptions of side effects presented in either frequency or percentage formats. They demonstrated the expected impact of gain/loss framing on perception of risk, that combined framing resulted in intermediate perceptions, and that the percentage format led to lower risk perception among respondents who were low in numeracy.
The studies differ in their participants (physicians v. general public), their stimuli (statistical outcomes of screening v. numerical descriptions of therapeutic effects), and their response tasks (decisions about effectiveness that have correct answers v. subjective ratings of risk), yet each of these studies reveals that risk perceptions are substantially influenced by the way "objective" risk data are described and presented. Each represents a relatively early exploration of the phenomenon in medical decision making, and each cries out for further research on the mechanisms of influence. Among the physicians in the first study who attempted to estimate numerical effectiveness of the cancer screening program, few provided estimates from a clearly determined source. Among the patients in the second study, the impact of numeracy on framing in medical decisions differed from that found in research on nonmedical decisions. We need to discover why.
One potentially fruitful direction for investigation is in linguistics. Even the communication of medical statistics is embedded in natural language and employed in linguistic contexts. Grice 3 argued that in a cooperative relationship, communication is characterized by a set of presumptions ("conversational maxims") that listeners are likely to hold when receiving information. These maxims-which include the presumptions that information presented will be true, relevant, and optimally informativecould naturally lead physicians to expect that 5-year survival rates are useful in making judgments about the effectiveness of screening over time (or else they would not be presented by journals) and patients to expect that risk information is framed as losses when it is important to evoke concern. Cognitive linguistic analyses suggest that mathematics is based in bodily experiences extended via conceptual metaphor, 4 a finding that may help shed light on how people understand frequency or percentage information. Linguists could be recruited and their methods fruitfully applied to aid decision psychologists in future research.
These studies challenge the conventional analogy of risk information as an intact object that is handed over from doctor to patient. Journals publish risk data that are interpreted by physicians, physicians share their perceptions of the data with patients, and patients construct their own perceptions of the risks and benefits of screening or treatment. Along the way, the data are transformed in accordance with the need, context, and understanding of the participants. As the authors of these articles suggest, improving risk communicationmoving from deceiving to informing-requires taking both risk perception and statistical understanding seriously.
